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DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACTOR PRICING STRATEGY
Abstract
This paper investigates pricing strategies used by major
defense contractors. Two pricing strategies are identified and
discussed: penetration, which calls for a relatively low initial
price followed by little reduction in price over time, and
skimming, which calls for a relatively high initial price coupled
with greater reduction in price over time. It is argued that
contractor pricing strategy will depend on features of the
defense program under consideration and features of the economic
environment prior to production on the program. An analysis was
conducted using data from a sample of major weapons system
programs in the aerospace industry. Findings indicate that
factors related to the funding for a program, expected program
length, defense spending and industry economic conditions
influence contractor choice of pricing strategy.

DETERMINANTS OF CONTRACTOR PRICING STRATEGY
The acquisition of major weapon systems is time consuming,
complex and expensive. During the acquisitions process,
particularly during contract negotiation, both the Department of
Defense and defense contracting firms pursue various strategies
to achieve their, perhaps conflicting, objectives. One element
of a contractor's strategy is his pricing strategy: the pattern
of prices charged for units procured over time. Do unit prices
decline as more units are procured or do unit prices remain
fairly stable? We felt that understanding what factors influence
contractor pricing strategy might be of value to contracting
officers and program managers involved in the acquisitions
process. This article argues that pricing strategy is influenced
by both features of the program under consideration and features
of the larger environment in which acquisition occurs. Evidence
on what factors do effect pricing strategy is presented in the
context of an analysis of strategies used by defense contractors
within the aerospace industry.
Two Pricing Strategies
There are numerous ways to describe or categorize pricing
strategies in general, but firms introducing new products or
technology typically use one of two common product pricing
approaches: penetration or skimming. 1 Discussed by many
authors, the two strategies are widely understood and used by
business practitioners. The objectives of the two strategies
1
differ. The skimming strategy calls for high initial prices
followed by lower prices at later stages. The objective of the
skimming strategy is to achieve the maximum profit in the short
run by charging the highest price that the market will bear.
Thus one advantage of skimming is a more rapid return on
investment.
In contrast, the penetration strategy calls for a low
initial price with little or no price reduction over time. The
objective of the penetration strategy is to gain entry and
establish a position in a market through a low initial price.
Once the market has been captured, the firm can take advantage of
either price increases or cost reductions to earn additional
profits. The firm's established market position dampens the
incentives of competitors to enter the market.
Pricing Strategy and Risk
Each of the two strategies can be described in terms of the
relationship between two variables: the price of the first unit
sold and the rate of price reduction over time. Skimmers exhibit
a high first unit price and a steep price reduction curve, while
penetrators exhibit a low first unit price and a flat price
reduction curve. Neither strategy is inherently more profitable
and both are observed in practice. The two strategies do however
differ in the timing of profits (short-term versus long-term) and
consequently in riskiness.
With a high initial price, skimming maximizes short-term
returns and provides a more rapid recovery of funds to finance
the costs of product introduction and future expansion. By front-
ending profit, skimming reduces the risk associated with
uncertainty in the product's market. Skimming allows for greater
flexibility; it is typically easier to introduce a product with a
high price and then reduce the price than it is to introduce at a
low price and increase price later to cover unexpected costs or
exploit product popularity. 2 Skimming emphasizes short run
profits and conseguently reduces the risks associated with
predicting future demand and future costs.
The penetration strategy sacrifices short run profits in an
attempt to capture the market and generate profits over the long
run. Penetration generally reguires a greater commitment of the
firm's resources, both because its long run orientation may
reguire greater investment in productive capacity and because the
reguired investment may not be adeguately financed out of the
relatively lower initial profits. "Attempting to take a sizeable
(market) share through lower price is risky and often reguires a
heavy and long commitment of financial resources. Since the
stakes and risks are high, the potential rewards must be
substantial". 3 "High rewards are possible with this strategy but
only if economies of scale occur as predicted. Therefore, it is
often a high risk strategy as well, since the potential exists
for disastrous losses if costs fail to decline as rapidly as
expected. Production problems or unrealized sales volumes can
also undermine this strategy". 4 Penetration appears to be the
more risky strategy.
Pricing Strategy in the Defense Market
Clearly defense acquisitions, particularly for major weapon
systems, is specialized in nature. Both the products and market
are not typical of products and markets in general. Major weapon
systems are large dollar items which may represent a substantial
segment of a manufacturer's business. Pricing strategy for such
items is likely to be an important strategic decision. Major
weapons systems incorporate significant innovation with state-of-
the-art hardware and substantial uncertainty in development. But
products involving significant innovation offer the possibility
of "learning" over time and provide the greatest leeway in
choosing a pricing strategy. 5 The market for defense systems is
also unusual, with a single (monopsonistic) buyer and usually
only a few (oligopolistic) sellers.
Readers familiar with defense contracting may question the
ability of manufacturers to exercise a pricing strategy. Prices
are determined primarily by competitive bids. A bid is accepted
and a contract for a specified number of units is negotiated
prior to production. Prices are specified in the contract and
are based on costs incurred ("cost plus") using some agreed upon
formula. Furthermore, cost estimates and their source must be
disclosed at the time of contract negotiation, so some agreement
on the validity of cost estimates is established up front.
Hence, prices may seem to be a direct function of costs incurred,
with little leeway allowed for contractor pricing discretion.
However, discretion enters through the determination of "cost."
In spite of regulation by the Cost Accounting Standards
Board, which governs the accounting for costs on government
contracts, substantial flexibility exists within allowable cost
accounting procedures. The allowable procedures permit
flexibility both in assigning cost to units produced and in
assigning costs across different periods. Accounting procedures
that permit the recognition of costs earlier or later provide a
contractor with the flexibility to "cost justify" different
pricing strategies. 6 Earlier recognition of costs is associated
with a higher first unit price and a steeper price reduction
curve. Delaying cost recognition permits a lower first unit
price but results in a flatter price reduction curve.
For example CASB standard #409 permits contractors to use
either straight line or accelerated depreciation methods to
account for the cost of capital assets. Accelerated depreciation
assigns greater cost to earlier periods (and units produced) and
less to later periods. Standards for dealing with the treatment
of materials (#411), acguisition cost of some assets (#404), home
office expenses (#403), administrative expenses (#410),
engineering costs (#420), service center costs (#418) and cost of
money (#414, #417) also allow contractors to choose among
different acceptable procedures or approaches in determining
"cost." Flexibility is inherent in accounting.
Evidence from a study of major aerospace weapon systems
conducted by Greer7 substantiates a strong relationship between
accounting methods used by contractors and contractor pricing
strategies. In short, while prices may be tied to costs incurred
in the defense contracting market, firms have an ability to
either skim or penetrate via the application of accounting
methods. (No dishonesty is implied here. Contractors can
legitimately select from among various acceptable procedures.
They are simply required to use the same procedures in accounting
for actual costs as were used in determining initial estimates of
cost.
)
If the acquisition of a particular defense system by the
government occurred at a single point in time under a single
unchangeable contract covering all units of a weapons system to
be procured, the ability of a manufacturer to influence unit
price through the measurement of cost would be of little
importance; shifting costs from earlier units produce to later
units (or vice versa) would have little impact on the total costs
and price for the complete output produced. But features of the
acquisitions environment preclude the use of a single,
unchangeable contract covering all units to be manufactured
during a weapons system acquisition program.
First, due to the complex nature and state-of-the-art
technology involved in major weapon systems, contracts are
frequently updated or revised to accommodate design and
production changes. Revision of an individual contract provides
the manufacturer the opportunity to "renegotiate" price and
profit. Second, because of the nature of the federal budget
process, funding for units procured under a weapons system
program is reviewed and approved on an annual basis.
Conseguently , system acquisition typically occurs in several
stages under several different contracts. This letting of new
contracts also provides the manufacturer the opportunity to
renegotiate.
A potential contractor on a new weapons system has two
alternatives. The firm can submit a high bid (e.g., skim by
setting a high price for initial units produced) , which tends to
insure profitability and the recovery of invested funds in the
short run but has the disadvantage that it increases the
probability that a competitor will secure the contract. Or a
firm can submit a low bid in an attempt to penetrate or "buy-in"
to the initial contract to capture the market (sometimes at an
initial loss) and presume that subsequent contract revision or
renegotiation or future contracts will result in satisfactory
profits in the long run.
The penetration strategy would appear to be more risky. The
complexity, innovation, and high performance requirements
associated with major weapon systems mean that their capability
and reliability cannot always be assessed in advance. This
creates uncertainties with respect to product acceptance and the
future demand for additional units by the Department of Defense.
Furthermore, the constantly changing economic and political
environment creates uncertainties with respect to the willingness
of congress or the executive branch to budget for additional
units. This results in uncertainties with respect to program
curtailment or termination. Technical, political and economic
consideration also effect the readiness of the Department of
Defense to revise or renegotiate existing contracts.
Observation of a low initial price indicates a willingness
by a contractor to commit resources to a program with the
possibility of only relatively low short term profits (or even a
loss) . A low initial price signals a willingness to "bet" on the
future and accept the risks of program curtailment or
termination, the uncertainties involved in trying to increase
price if contracts are revised, the uncertainties associated with
future procurement contracts, and the accompanying uncertainties
associated with long run profit realization.
It might be argued that skimming is risky because a skimmer
has a greater "risk" of losing the contract. However this would
be an inappropriate use of the term. Risk implies uncertainty,
not probability. It is true that a skimming strategy increases
the "probability" of losing a contract. But what a skimming
strategy really signals is an unwillingness to place a "bet" on
the uncertain future, an unwillingness to play the "game" unless
success is assured through the locking in of profits in the short
run by setting price high initially. A reluctance to play unless
success is assured is consistent with risk averse behavior and
fully consistent with penetration being a more risky strategy.
Neither strategy is inherently more profitable, although
8
they may differ in the timing of the realization of profits.
When would a contractor adopt one strategy instead of the other?
When would a contractor have an incentive to buy-in with a
relatively lower initial price and accept the greater risks
associated with the penetration strategy? In the next section we
outline several factors that we felt had the potential for
influencing contractor pricing strategy.
Factors Influencing Pricing Strategy
We thought that two broad concerns should influence
contractor pricing strategy: The nature of the specific program
under consideration and the nature of the political or economic
environment existing at the time of contract negotiation on the
program. 8 Several variables are listed below. Each is an
attempt to reflect some feature of the program or some feature of
the environment. We have tried to suggest, for each variable,
how it might influence a contractor's willingness to compete by
reducing initial price and hence why it might be associated with
pricing strategy.
Program Value . Obtaining a contract for a major new weapons
system is a significant event for a firm. Jobs are created and
future profits are expected. We felt that a contractor's
willingness to compete on price for a new program would be
related to the value of the program to the firm, and expected
that a penetration strategy would be more likely with higher
value programs. Program value was measured by total cost of the
9
program over its life.
Program Length . Obtaining a contract for a program that is
expected to extend over several future years has distinct
benefits for a firm. Facilities costs can be amortized over
longer periods. Revenues can be expected to continue for several
future periods. We felt that willingness to compete on initial
price would be influenced by the number of years a program was
expected to run and expected that a penetration strategy would be
more likely with longer term programs.
Program Size . As argued above, contractors may be more
willing to compete on price for programs of high value. However,
another factor may come into play. If an individual program is
small relative to the total operations of a firm, experiencing
unexpected costs and losses on the program, while damaging, would
not be critical. In contrast, if an individual program comprises
a substantial portion of a firms total operations greater risk is
incurred. Unfavorable performance on the contract could have
significant implications for the performance of the firm as a
whole. Conseguently when a program is large relative to the
total operations of the contractor, we expected that contractors
would be less willing to accept a low initial price, and instead
reduce risk by pursuing a skimming strategy. We measured program
size relative to firm size by dividing the average yearly value
of a program by the contractor's total sales. 9
Defense Spending . What was the congressional and budgetary
environment like at the time programs were being negotiated? Were
10
constraints being imposed on defense spending? Were non-defense
programs favored? Was defense spending increasing? We felt that
contractors would have less incentive to reduce initial price if
the environment appeared to be favorable to defense spending,
hence a skimming strategy would be expected. Two variables were
used to reflect the defense spending environment: 10 (a) Defense
spending as a proportion of total federal spending, which
indicates the relative budget emphasis between defense and non-
defense federal programs, and (b) the rate of growth in defense
spending, which indicates changing commitment to defense programs
over time.
Industry Conditions . To the extent that an individual
firm's facilities are currently being employed, incentives to
compete for defense work in general and for a specific new
defence contract in particular may be lessened. Such firms may
feel they are in a strong position to bargain for a higher
initial price. More generally, when facilities within an
industry are being fully employed there may be reduced incentive
for all firms to compete for additional work and less concern
that a particular competitor will offer a low price to secure a
program. In short, pricing strategy may be associated with
current utilization of productive capacity within an industry.
We expected the penetration strategy to be more likely when
capacity utilization is relatively low. 11 Two variables were
used to reflect the industry environment: a) percent of industry
capacity utilization, which indicates current industry
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conditions, and b) the rate of growth or decline in capacity
utilization, which indicates the trend in industry conditions.
General Economic Conditions . Perhaps economic conditions-
growth or contraction - influence pricing strategy. If the
economy is robust, demand for products should be relatively
greater, opportunities for commercial projects may be more
plentiful, and incentives to compete on initial price for a
particular defense contract may be reduced. Consequently a
skimming strategy may be followed. When economic contraction
occurs, new defense programs may appear more appealing and the
increased incentives to compete for such contracts may result in
a penetration strategy. The rate of growth in Gross National
Product (constant dollar) was used to reflect economic
conditions.
Inflation . Inflation makes future dollars worth less than
current dollars. If inflation is high firms may prefer to adopt
a pricing strategy that leads to rapid returns on a new project.
As indicated previously, neither skimming nor penetration is an
inherently more profitable strategy, but skimming, with the
higher initial prices, tends to lead to more rapid returns and
earlier recovery of funds. Consequently we expected skimming to
be associated with an environment characterized by relatively
greater inflation.
Commitment to the Program . There is inevitably some
uncertainty concerning the long run commitment of the government
to individual weapon systems. Long run plans may be made, but
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the federal budget is discussed and revised annually. Programs
that are supported one year by an administration or congress may
be cut in subseguent years as the administration, congress or
political conditions change. To the extent that long run
commitment to a particular weapon system is doubtful, contractors
may have incentives to seek relatively higher initial prices to
reduce future risks of program curtailment, i.e. to skim. If
commitment to a program is not in guest ion, contractors may be
more willing to buy into a contract, having greater confidence
that program curtailment will not threaten returns expected in
future years. Commitment to a program is not readily measured,
but funds allocated to a program, as reflected in annual
obligational authority, may provide an indication of the
governments willingness to commit to the program. "Early"
allocation of funds may reflect a strong initial commitment. We
divided the initial year obligational authority for a program by
the total obligational authority over the life of the program,
creating a measure reflecting the proportion of the project that
was funded "up front". We expected this measure of early
commitment to be associated with a penetration pricing strategy
by contractors.
Acguisitions Environment . The environment in which military
acguisitions occur has not remained static over the years. The
phrase "Military - Industrial Complex" was unfamiliar before
Eisenhower left the presidency, but awareness of the links
between the DoD and the defense industry is now pervasive. A
13
somewhat symbiotic relationship between the DoD and the defense
industry has developed. Many stories of cost overruns have been
told. Scrutiny of the acquisitions process by congress and the
pubic has increased in recent years. Calls for increased
competition have been heard. Oversight, regulations and
procedures governing acquisition have been revised and altered
over the years. Have these changes had any consistent effect on
pricing strategy? To the extent that increasing scrutiny of
defense acquisitions have motivated contractors to compete for
defense work by offering lower initial prices, one might expect
that penetration strategies have increased in more recent years.
If the DoD has become more dependant on individual contractors,
if weapon system technology has become more complex and uncertain
(creating the opportunity for contractors to demand subsequent
price increases to cover unexpected costs) , and if contractors
have become more powerful and successful in asserting demands for
price increases, then one might also expect increasing use of
penetration strategies in more recent years. It is possible to
document whether there has been a general trend toward more or
less use of one pricing strategy or the other. A variable
indicating the calender year in which programs were initially
undertaken is included in the analysis to capture any general
trend.
A summary of the variables are included in table 1. In the
following sections we provide evidence that the anticipated


























Total cost of program over its
full life
Number of years program ran
Average yearly value of program
divided by contractor size
(sales)
Defense spending divided by
total federal spending




Rate of growth or decline in
industry capacity utilization
Rate of growth or decline of
GNP
Inflation rate measured using
the producer price index-
industr ial
Initial obligational authority
for a program divided by total
obligational authority
Year of initial production on
program
Whether or not a program was a
new model of a previously
produced system

pricing strategy tend to exist.
Slope of the Price Reduction Curve
As indicated before, the two strategies can be described in
terms of the relationship between first unit price and the
subseguent price reduction curve. Learning curves can be used to
distinguish the two strategies. Learning curve theory describes
the decline in per unit production costs a manufacturer
experiences with increasing volume. A per unit reduction can be
extended conceptually to the measure of price per unit. Thus
learning curves can also be used to represent price reduction
curves.
The learning curve function relates price with volume as
follows:
P=AXB
Where P is the average price per unit of producing X units and A
is the price of the first unit. The slope of the learning curve,
S, is related to B as follows:
B = In S
In 2
A slope of 1.00 implies a horizontal line - i.e. no price
reduction. The lower the decimal value of the slope, the higher
the price reduction rate. For example, .800 is a steeper price
reduction rate than .900.
In this study, we used slopes of learning curves fit to
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actual prices to reflect pricing strategy. Relatively high
values for S (flat slope) are consistent with penetration, while
lower values (steeper reduction) are consistent with skimming.
Because price reduction slopes are used to reflect pricing
strategy, one additional variable was included in the analysis as
a control. While pricing strategy should affect the slope of the
price reduction curve on a given project, pricing strategy is not
the only factor influencing the slope. When a project is the
first production model of a weapon system, some learning and some
reduction in unit price over time can be expected. When a
project is a "follow-on" project - a new model of previously
produced item - less learning and price reduction should occur.
For example Lockheed produced both the P-3a and P-3b. One would
likely expect a flatter price reduction curve (higher slope) for
the follow on P-3b model. A variable (FOLLOW), coded 1 if the
program was the first production model of a weapon system and 2
if a follow-on model, was included in the analysis to capture
this probable effect on price reduction slopes.
Aerospace Weapons Programs
We investigated pricing strategy for major military aircraft
and missile weapon systems acquired by DoD from 1953-1980. Data
on prices, and specifically price reduction slopes calculated
using learning curves (based on constant dollars) , were collected
from two publications: U.S. Military Aircraft Cost Handbook and
U.S. Military Missile Cost Handbook . 12




Proiect Contractor Years Slope
F-102A General Dynamics 53-57 .724
F-100D North American 54-56 .934
F-101A/B/C McDonnell Douglas 54-59 .802
F-8A/B/C Vought 55-58 .831
A-4B McDonnell Douglas 55-57 .834
F-104A/B/C Lockheed 56-57 1. 154
B-52G Boeing 57-59 .869
F-105B/D Republic 57-62 .759
F-106A/B General Dynamics 57-59 .837
A-4C McDonnell Douglas 57-62 .894
F-8D/E Vought 58-63 .882
F-4A/B McDonnell Douglas 59-66 .834
P-3A Lockheed 60-64 .718
AIM-9C Motorola 61-67 .961
RIM-8E Bendix 61-66 .916
A-6A Grumman 61-69 .829
RIM-2D General Dynamics 61-64 .976
RIM-2E General Dynamics 61-66 .921
RIM-24B General Dynamics 61-66 .923
A-4E McDonnell Douglas 61-64 .892
F-4D McDonnell Douglas 64-66 .886
A-7A/B Vought 65-67 .852
P-3B Lockheed 65-67 .910
RIM-66A General Dynamics 66-70 .763
RIM-67A General Dynamics 66-74 .825
A-7E Vought 67-79 1. 000
A-37B Cessna 67-73 .935
A-7D Vought 68-75 .950
P-3C Lockheed 68-82 .972
AIM-7F Raytheon 68-80 .773
A-6E Grumman 70-79 .937
F-111F General Dynamics 70-74 1.115
F-14A Grumman 71-82 .990
RIM-66B General Dynamics 71-80 1.135
S-3A Lockheed 72-76 .846
F-15A McDonnell Douglas 73-79 .917
RIM-67B General Dynamics 73-82 1. 041
AGM-78D General Dynamics 73-75 1. 088
AH-1S Bell 75-80 .891
A-10A Fairchild 75-82 .963
AH-1T Bell 76-78 1.021
F-16A General Dynamics 78-82 .954
F/A-18A McDonnell Douglas 79-82 .860
AIM-7M Raytheon 80-82 .880
RIM-66E1 General Dynamics 80-82 1.089
BGM-109 General Dynamics 80-82 .943

programs but programs had to pass three filters to be included in
the study. First, programs had to run at least three years in
order to calculate meaningful slopes. Second, programs that were
duplicates were eliminated. For example, price histories for the
A-7A and A-7B were available both individually and combined as
one program. The combined history was used, the individual
programs were not. Third, programs where learning curves fit to
the raw price data provided a poor "fit" were eliminated. Since
the purpose here is to explain variations in price-reduction
curves, only programs with well-defined price reduction slopes
were included. An R 2 value in excess of .6 was used as a cutoff
for program inclusion. The remaining group consisted of 46
programs. Program identifiers, the manufacturer, the year of
program initiation and price reduction slopes for the 46 programs
are provided in table 2.
Correlation Analysis
In general our objective was to determine if the explanatory
factors outlined earlier explained variation in the price
reduction slopes in a manner consistent with our predictions. As
a first step, we correlated each variable independently with
price reduction slope. Expected signs (assuming the factors are
related to pricing strategy in the way we anticipated) and actual
correlations are in table 3. Several findings are of interest.
Seven of the twelve variables are significant at traditional
significance levels and each of the seven has the predicted sign.
















** p< . 01
TABLE 3















(PSIZE) may motivate skimming. Skimming also appears to be
encouraged when defense spending is great relative to total
federal spending (DEFSPND) , when defense spending is growing
(DEFGRO) and when industry capacity utilization is growing
(CAPUGRO)
.
A penetration strategy seems to occur when initial
funding for a program is great (FUNDS) . There has also been a
general trend toward penetration pricing over the last three
decades (YEAR) . And as expected, price reduction is less evident
for follow on programs (FOLLOW)
.
Multivariate Tests
While univariate correlations provide some insights, perhaps
a fuller story can be told by controlling for possible inter-
relationships between the explanatory variables in a multivariate
model
.
We used stepwise multiple regression to create a model
including several variables jointly explaining the variance in
slopes. Stepwise regression is a statistical procedure which
adds one variable at a time to a model depending on which
variable most assists in explaining the variable of interest, in
this case price reduction slope. By selectively influencing the
entry of variables into the model during the stepwise procedure,
a researcher has some control over the model that results and
gains some insight into the interrelationship between explanatory
variables and their relative ability to explain the dependant




We investigated various models in a heuristic and iterative
fashion. We were concerned with two qualitative factors in
constructing the model:
1. Parsimony: We preferred a model with few variables.
2. Lack of interrelationship between explanatory
variables: High correlation between pairs of variables
or high "collinearity" among several variables in a
model causes coefficients to be less meaningful and the
model to be less useful for prediction.
We considered three statistical items to determine when we
had arrived at a "good" model:
1. The overall significance of the model (F value).
2. The significance of individual ratios in the model (t
statistics for ratio coefficients)
.
3. The explanatory power of the model (adjusted R-squared
values)
.
Table 4 provides detail on a representative model. Looking at
the table, several items are of note: The model is highly
significant and has a reasonably high R 2 value. It explains
about half of the variation among contractors in price reduction
slopes. Each of the five variables included in the model is
significant with the predicted coefficient sign.
Interpretation of the Model
In general the model demonstrates that pricing strategy is
significantly associated with various factors reflecting features




Variable Coef f icie nt t-Value siqn if icanc
Intercept .337
FOLLON .053 2.25 .003
FUNDS .356 3.93 .001
PLENGTH .008 1.95 .058
DEFGRO -.188 -2.05 .047






CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
.27
PSIZE DEFSPN1} YEAR INFLA DEFGRO CAPU CAPUGRO ECONGRO FUNDS FOLLON
.34 .15 -.07 -.10 .12 -.11 .03 -.14 -.20 -.36





















































attention to these factors may be useful for detecting contractor
pricing strategy. A relatively small collection of variables
appears to explain a fair amount of variation in price reduction
slopes.
The individual explanatory variables in the model are also
of interest but taking a look at some interrelationships between
the explanatory variables is necessary for a more complete
interpretation. Table 5 provides pairwise correlations between
the explanatory variables. In general the correlations are
relatively low, with the exception of correlations within two
subsets of the variables (enclosed in the triangles) . DEFSPND,
YEAR, INFLA and PSIZE are interrelated. The high positive
association between INFLA and YEAR is perhaps not surprising; it
is well known that inflation was higher in the 1970 's than in
earlier decades. In retrospect, the high negative association
between DEFSPND and YEAR is also not surprising; the growing
emphasis on social programs, starting in the 1960 's, has reduced
the proportion of government spending devoted to defense
programs. (In fact the very high correlation between DEFSPND and
YEAR suggests that these two measures are almost substitutes for
each other.
)
Similarly, DEFGRO, CAPU, CAPUGRO and ECONGRO are positively
inter-related. Again this is not surprising. General economic
growth (ECONGRO) should be reflected in growth within the
aerospace industry (CAPUGRO) . General economic growth should
also make defense spending growth (DEFGRO) more acceptable, which
20
should be reflected in aerospace industry growth.
When sets of individual explanatory variables are highly
associated with each other they tend to collectively capture some
common underlying dimension. 13 Inclusion of one variable in a
regression model reduces the chance that another from the same
set will provide additional power to explain the dependant
variable. With this as background, a better interpretation of
the variables in the model is possible. The model shows that
five factors explain price reduction slopes.
1. Follow-on Programs: Price reduction slopes tend to be
flatter when the program is a new model of a previously produced
weapon system. This was expected since the most substantial
learning, and cost reduction, should occur during the first
production model.
2. Program Funding: Variable FUNDS was one of the most
consistently important and highly significant explanations of
pricing strategy in all regression models constructed. When
initial obligational authority for a program was high relative to
the total value of a program, contractors tended to use the
penetration strategy. This indicates that the apparent
commitment of the government to a program, as reflected in funds
initially allocated, impacts contractor pricing. High initial
commitment may reduce contractor fear that the program will be
terminated or curtailed before sufficient returns can be realized
and, by reducing this risk, permit the contractor to reduce
initial prices during contract negotiation.
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3. Program Length: The penetration strategy was also
associated with programs that extended for longer periods of
time. Extended programs may benefit contractors by allowing them
to lock in revenues for future periods and reduce the costs and
uncertainty associated with the level of operations in future
periods. Such benefits appear to be reflected in a greater
willingness to reduce initial prices.
4. Industry Condition and Outlook: Variable DEFGRO appears
in the model presented in table 4 but, as discussed above,
several other variables tend to capture the same underlying
dimension. Other models were constructed including CAPU or
CAPUGRO in place of DEFGRO, with little decrease in explanatory
power. Thus it is probably not growth in defense spending per se
that affects pricing strategy. Rather growth in defense spending
is associated with higher utilization of industry capacity and
expectations of continued industry health. And when capacity is
adequately being utilized incentives to compete for new defense
projects are reduced. Consequently skimming pricing strategies
are pursued.
5. Trend: Variable YEAR appears in the model presented in
table 4 but YEAR was correlated with other variables,
particularly DEFSPND. (DEFSPND could replace YEAR in the model
with little effect on explanatory power. ) What is clear is that
there has been a trend over the last three decades towards
increasing use of the penetration strategy. This could be due to
the increasing emphasis over time on non-defense spending causing
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contractors to reduce initial prices in order to buy into the
budget. As indicated earlier, other explanations are also
possible. Increasing scrutiny of defense acguisitions may
motivate contractors to reduce initial price demands, while the
increasing interdependence of DoD and defense contractors may
permit contractors to renegotiate later prices, insuring
satisfactory profits. These effects would result in the apparent
trend toward penetration strategies.
Final Comment
Our objective has been to provide evidence concerning the
effect of various factors on contractor pricing strategy. Our
purpose in presenting the model was to document and describe the
nature of those effects. Our findings suggests that program
features and features of the acguisitions environment impact the
pricing strategy used by defense contractors. Taken as a whole
the analysis suggests three broad conclusions:
1. There has been a general trend toward buy-in or
penetration pricing strategies during the last three decades.
This is consistent with the trend toward greater non-defense
federal spending motivating contractors to buy into the budget
with reduced initial prices.
2. Contractors tend to adopt penetration strategies when
initial funding for a program is high and when the expected
duration of a program is long. 3oth of these factors may provide
contractors with some assurance that a program will not be
terminated before sufficient returns can be earned and
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consequently permit contractors to reduce initial price.
3. Contractors tend to adopt skimming strategies when
defense spending and industry capacity utilization are increasing
or when capacity utilization is high. This is consistent with
strong demand for the industry's output lessening contractor
incentive to reduce initial price.
It should be noted that this study has addressed defense
programs over a three decade period. The acquisitions
environment has changed significantly during that period. Today
the emphasis is on increased competition in defense procurement.
This has been reflected in policies toward increased financing of
contractor facilities by the government, with the objective of
opening the door to competition and increasing the possibility of
second sourcing. We now have "competition advocates." And
performance measurement of contracting officers incorporate
measures designed to reflect the degree to which competition in
procurement is achieved. The result of these and other changes
in the acquisitions environment suggest that contractors may be
increasingly facing circumstances in which penetration-type
strategies may be necessary to secure contracts. (This is
consistent with the general trend toward penetration noted in the
sample.) What has changed by the increased competition demanded
by the government, however, is the range over which different
pricing strategies may be effectively pursued, not the concept of
pricing strategy per se. It is likely that the incentives
outlined in this article still influence contractor actions.
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We hope that contracting officers, program managers or
others involved in acguisition activities may gain some insight
into the pricing practices of contractors from our analysis.
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NOTES
1. For a discussion of pricing strategies see "The Pricing
Decision: Part I - The Cornerstone of the Marketing Plan,"
Small Business Report , Vol. 10, No. 5, May 1985, pp. 71-77;
Dean, J., "Pricing Pioneering Products", Journal of
Industrial Economics , (July 1969), pp. 180-187; and Wind, Y.
Product Policy: Concepts, Methods and Strategy , (Addison-
Wesley, 1982)
.
2. For further elaboration of features of the skimming strategy
see Dean, op. cit. and Caferelli, E. , Developing New




3. Direct guotation from Caferelli, op. cit., p. 176.
4. Direct guotation from "The Pricing Decision", op. cit.,
p. 77.
5. See Wasson, C. , Dynamic Competitive Strategy & Product Life
Cycles , (Challenge Books, 1974)
.
6. See Greer, W.
,
and S. Liao, "Cost Analysis for Competitive
Major Weapon System Procurement: Further Refinement and
Extension, "Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report, NPS
54-84-023, Monterey, CA. , Sept. 1984.
7. Greer, W. "Early Detection of a Seller's Pricing Strategy,"
Program Manager , Nov-Dec. 1985, pp. 6-12.
8. In a related study, K. McGrath and O. Moses investigated the
links between pricing strategy and contractor's financial
condition. Using a sample of defense aerospace contractors,
similar to the sample in this paper, they found that firms
with lower financial risk and lower utilization of assets
tended to penetrate. See "Financial Condition and
Contractor Pricing Strategy", Program Manager (September-
October 1987), pp. 11-19.
9. Note that these first three variables, (program value,
program length, program size) , use measures of the actual
value of a program and the actual length of a program in
their computation. Actual value and length would not be
known prior to completion of the program. In principle,
measures of the "expected" value or length of a program
should be used to reflect the pricing strategy incentives
hypothesized to exist before production commences. Use of
the ex post actual measures assumes that they are reasonable
surrogates for ex ante expectations. Alternative measures
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for program value and program size were determined using the
initial obligational authority for the programs rather than
total costs over the program life. Findings were similar
using these alternatives. Constant dollar measures were
used for all alternatives.
10. Defense spending was measured one year prior to the start of
production on a program. Growth in defense spending was
measured over the period from two years to one year prior.
This assumes that measures taken at that point in time are
representative of the environment in existence when
contractor pricing strategy was formulated. Other variables
designed to reflect industry and economic conditions were
measured at analogous points in time prior to the start of
production.
11. Contractors may have separate divisions for commercial and
DoD work, each being operated, in effect, as separate
businesses, with corporate headquarters acting in the role
of a bank providing funds to finance projects. Ideally we
would like a measure of the capacity utilization of the DoD
division of firms to more precisely capture the incentives
that may be operating. Such measures however were not
readily available. Industry measures provide a rough
surrogate. In any event, work by Greer and Liao, op. cit.
,
indicates that industry measures of capacity utilization
prove to be better predictors of contractor pricing behavior
than to firm specific capacity utilization measures.
12. DePuy, S., et al., U.S. Military Aircraft Cost Handbook , TR-
8203-1, (Management Consulting & Research, Inc., 1983) and
Crawford, D.
,
et al., U.S. Military Missile Cost Handbook ,
TR-8203-3, (Management Consulting and Research, Inc., 1984).
13. A formal factor analysis of the explanatory variables was
conducted. PSIZE, DEFSPND, YEAR and INFLA formed a distinct
factor with YEAR having the highest factor loading.
Similarly DEFGRO, CAPU, CAPUGRO AND ECONGRO form a distinct
factor, with CAPUGRO having the highest factor loading. All
other variables represented distinct individual factors.
Regression models using factor scores rather than individual
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